

4 JUL 1974

NOTE FOR: Director of Communications
Director of Joint Computer Support
Director of Personnel
Director of Security
Director of Training
Chief, Information Systems Analysis Staff

An expeditious review of the attached suggests that the DCI's comments and proposals would have an impact on various DD/M&S Offices. In view of the extremely short deadline, please provide comments by noon on 10 June 1974 so that your views can be incorporated or attached to a DD/M&S position paper.


LJD

cc: OMS, OF, C/HS

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Suspense: Noon - 10 June 1974

*DD/M&S 74-2015: Statement fr the Director entitled: "Perspectives for Intelligence - 1975-1980"

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PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE - 1975-1980

Introduction

1. These Perspectives for Intelligence 1975-1980 are issued by the Director of Central Intelligence to provide general guidance for planning for all elements of the Intelligence Community for the next five years. They are particularly designed to stimulate early action on problems requiring long-term research, development, or planning such as complex technical systems, language training, skills augmentation, etc. They are designed to influence decisions during the forthcoming Fiscal Year 1975 but whose effects will be felt only after several years. For Fiscal Year 1975, near-term guidance is provided in the Director's Objectives submitted to the President, which include both Substantive Objectives (further detailed in Key Intelligence Questions) and Resource Management Objectives (further specified in Sub-Objectives).

2. These Perspectives open with a general overview of the political, economic and security environment anticipated during the coming five years (Part I). This is followed by an overall statement of the anticipated role of intelligence in these situations during that period (Part II). Finally, more specific guidance is given with respect to

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activities which should be planned or initiated in order to meet the needs of the period ahead (Part III).

3. The Perspectives are focused on major intelligence problems and guidance. They recognize but do not deal with three additional categories of problems which will require attention and resources during the coming years:

(a) Continuing lower priority national responsibilities which must be satisfied but which at the same time must be sharply limited in their call upon resources.

(b) Departmental or tactical intelligence support of subordinate civil and military elements of the United States Government. These will also require continuing investment of attention and resources, but they should be in an appropriate proportion to those devoted to national priority matters.

(c) Unexpected problems or crises not anticipated in the discussions herein but which can pose major political, economic or security problems to the United States. Some attention and resources will certainly be diverted for such purposes, and some appropriate level of reserve capability must be included in planning to meet them.

Part I - Major World Problems

1. The USSR. The Communist Party bureaucratic structure will probably continue to rule the USSR, whether or not a change occurs in the individual leaders thereof. Soviet

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policy will continue to reflect a drive to maintain at least strategic equality with the United States, and superiority if it can be obtained at a reasonable risk, but a conscious decision to initiate hostilities against the U.S. is not likely. At the same time, Soviet policy will seek a degree of international respectability, positive political relationships with other nations and the economic benefits of trade and technological exchange. There will be some ebb and flow between these two approaches to the United States, but the USSR will continue to be the greatest single military power outside the United States, it will be a competitor with respect to world influence, and it will be the principal counterpart in a large number of bilateral and multilateral negotiations on political, economic and security matters.

There may be some amelioration of the authoritarian economic structure of the Soviet Union and greater opportunity for access, trade and intercourse with the Soviet economy. At the same time, there is not likely to be any substantial amelioration of Soviet authoritarian political discipline, internal security controls, and high degree of secrecy with respect to Soviet political and military programs and policies.

Moscow's military power will be of particular importance to the United States. Unless constrained by arms limitation agreements, the USSR will continue to improve its strategic

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forces, maintain and modernize its general purpose forces, and gradually augment its capabilities at sea (surface presence, submarine attack and SLBM and ASW). The Soviets will continue to develop their satellite capabilities for intelligence, antisatellite attack, communications and possibly space platforms for offensive activity. The Soviets will continue their heavy emphasis on defense, particularly air defense, and on the possible development of new techniques of laser or similar air or ABM defense systems, unless limited by arms limitation agreements.

Moscow will continue to be the counterpart to the United States in arms limitation negotiations. Prospects for progress in these fields will be in part dependent on Moscow's perception of threats from other sources such as China, its concern at maintaining a predominance over its neighbors and satellites, its respect for American capabilities and its deep-seated suspicions of the non-Communist world stemming from Communist doctrine.

2. China. Almost certainly, China will undergo a change in leadership. The succession could see an initial collegial unity followed by an authoritarian, aggressive and hostile xenophobic leader. The initial period could also be followed by a fragmentation into a variety of contesting military, party, and provincial elements. For planning purposes, how-

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ever, it would seem most appropriate to assume that the follow-on leadership in China will retain the unity and authoritarian discipline imposed by the Communist Party, that it will be primarily concerned with internal unity and meeting the social and economic problems within China, and that it will maintain an arms-length, somewhat hostile attitude toward any element on its periphery or elsewhere which might be deemed to offer a threat to China.

China will continue gradually to develop its strategic forces and will present a retaliatory threat to the Soviet Union. By 1980, it will have the capability of threatening the United States with a demonstration (or desperation) strike by a small number of ICBMs. China will maintain large general purpose forces capable of operations on its periphery but will be unlikely to commit them in the absence of major provocation or concern.

Internally, China will continue its authoritarian economic programs, but these are unlikely to accomplish more than keep China up to the growth of its population. Internationally, China will endeavor to become the ideological leader of the Third World, will participate in aid programs and similar political gestures with other Third World powers but will not establish substantial authority over Third World countries.

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3. Europe. Western Europe will continue the process of gradual political, economic, and military integration but will be handicapped by a continuation of the same centrifugal forces working today. French nationalism, suspicion of undue German power, ultimate reliance on U.S. support against the USSR, absence of dynamic leadership, the relaxing effect of continued detente and the effects of internal political fragmentation will all cause Europe to continue its complex internal negotiations and show hesitancy toward more vigorous common policies or positions. Substantial economic problems will face European countries individually and collectively as the Third World becomes more aggressive on this subject.

4. East Europe. East Europe will continue to be under Soviet control, with some loosening of its ties insisted upon by the East Europeans. The five-year period could see an explosion from within one or more Eastern European countries against Soviet dominance, but this would likely be of short duration and overall Soviet hegemony will soon be reestablished. Internal discipline may be alleviated in these countries at the cost of continued adherence to the Soviet alliance--a form of "Finlandization." Economic relations with the West and with the Third World will grow in quantity and in independence from Soviet control. The passing of Tito could open an arena of difficulty and contest over the succession internally and over the future orientation of Yugoslavia externally.

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5. Japan. Japan will continue to play a major economic role in the Pacific and as a participant in international economic affairs generally. It will continue a restrained political role but will endeavor to establish some form of coexistence with both China and the Soviet Union. It will continue a security relationship with the United States in a low key but probably be less and less amenable to strong American influence in political and security affairs. The internal Japanese scene is not apt to change so substantially as to affect Japan's role abroad.

6. New Powers. During the coming years, a number of nations will increase in absolute and relative strength and become at least regional great powers, plus playing more substantial roles in world international forums. An example is Brazil, whose economic and political power is growing in Latin America. Another is Iran, whose Shah is determined to build Iran's relative strength in the region so as to play a full great power role there. Nigeria in Africa could also develop this sort of role. Aside from these, several nations having considerable influence within regions will display greater independence from the close U.S. relationship which may have characterized them in the past. This will be particularly prevalent in the economic field, but it will also display itself in various international relationships. Examples of such

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powers are Canada, Australia, Mexico, and Thailand, plus several South American nations such as Venezuela, Panama, and Peru.

7. The Third World will present a variety of problems. A number of local disputes will preoccupy not only the leaders of individual countries but the international community. Examples are relationships between India and Pakistan, black and white Sub-Sahara Africa, and Southern Arabia. Several existing disputes will continue to be a matter of concern to the international community and be the seeds of potential larger scale involvement (Arabs and Israel, North and South Vietnam, North and South Korea, Taiwan). A number of Third World countries will become increasingly antagonistic toward the great powers and their local presence in the economic, political and cultural spheres, e.g., in Africa, Latin America and South Asia. In this respect some identity of interest may grow between nations divided by the Cold War, developing into collaboration against both superpower complexes, e.g., Cuba and the Caribbean, the Arab nations, the rising Black nations of Africa, and the nations of the Malay Archipelago. Internally, many Third World nations will suffer serious damage from tribal and regional differences, economic extremism, and ideological zealots (India, Cambodia, Ethiopia, et al). Some of the Third World will find an outlet for its frustrations in self-defeating assaults on great power economic relationships

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and in hamstringing the effectiveness of a variety of international forums,

8. Social change will cause turbulence and possibly create power vacuums in a number of areas. These will stem from increased expectations and a perception of the growing economic gap between less developed countries (and classes within countries) and the developed world. Areas particularly susceptible to this process will be the Persian Gulf, certain other Arab states such as Morocco, India, possibly the Malay Archipelago (including the Philippines) and the Caribbean. Internally this turbulence may be temporarily stilled by authoritarian governments, but they will have difficulties in maintaining themselves over the longer term and transferring power to successors. The resulting turbulence can present temptations to neighboring states to exploit long-standing differences or to great powers desirous of extending their influence. Such turbulence will also exist within advanced nations, as economic, racial, ideological, or regional minorities turn to violence and terrorism to press their claims against more and more delicately tuned and interdependent societies.

9. The acceleration of events will be a characteristic of the years ahead. This will come from improved communication and transportation, sharply reducing the time available to

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reflect on, negotiate, and resolve international problems. It will also raise many local events to international prominence and inflate national or political pride, posing further handicaps to successful negotiations. There will be a resulting tendency towards shorter attention spans for individual situations and a need for simultaneous perception and management of a multiplicity of international relationships. Acceleration will also mark the process of change. To a major degree this will occur in the fields of science and technology, but the pace there will have substantial effects on the pace of sociological, industrial, and institutional change, with resultant political and economic impacts. Identification and accurate assessments of such changes and their effects will be needed on an increasingly rapid or even immediate basis.

Part II - The Role of Intelligence

1. The primary charge on intelligence during the years ahead will be to provide accurate data and assessments with respect to the variety of complicated problems facing the United States. These must be in formats which will facilitate their communication to those responsible for decisions about U.S. policy. In particular, the need will be for early warning, because of the acceleration of events, to permit the resolution through negotiation of matters which might otherwise involve

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political, economic or military contest or unrest. The acceleration of events and the explosion of information will also require a major effort by intelligence to process raw information into manageable form and to devise adequate techniques for presentation to assist consumers in the identification of the essential elements of foreign situations, the reliability of our assessments and the likely impact of alternative policy decisions. Intelligence will be increasingly expected to provide assessments of the intentions and likely courses of action of foreign powers, in addition to exact facts and the basic capabilities available to them.

2. The USSR. The USSR will remain as the major intelligence target. Its military power, its economic role in the world, its political policies will continue to pose major problems for American leadership. Intelligence will be expected to provide precise data on Soviet military capabilities and economic activity. It will be expected also to supply reliable information on Soviet political dynamics and intentions. These must be supplemented by clear and accurate assessments of likely Soviet courses of action in the political, economic and military fields. While a small percentage of this material will become available through open exchange and access, vast fields of highly important information will be kept by the Soviets within a closed society, requiring extraordinary efforts

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to obtain them. A particular requirement will be accurate and demonstrable monitoring of arms limitations agreements made with the Soviet Union. In the military field special attention will be focused on Soviet research and development, in particular with respect to weapons systems which could substantially affect the balance of power (anti-submarine warfare, satellite systems, strategic deception, etc.). The readiness of Soviet forces will be a constant subject of attention. Intelligence will be required to maintain a base-line capability for tactical intelligence coverage, for rapid augmentation in case of local or general confrontation or conflict. Trends and factions in Soviet leadership and political doctrine will be a major subject of interest, to assist in negotiations and to warn of undesirable developments ahead. The Soviet role abroad, either directly through diplomatic means or indirectly through party or subversive means, will be a matter of particular attention with respect to the turbulence of the Third World. Soviet policy, power and determination will be of importance in Eastern Europe as well as in some of the areas of great power competition or exploitation of local power vacuums (Persian Gulf, India, etc.).

3. China. China will continue to be a second but still important intelligence target. The closed nature of Chinese society will continue and make it of great importance to know

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with precision the possibility of difficulty within China or by threats it might pose abroad. This will become particularly important as Chinese strategic power grows in range and threatens a larger group of allies and the United States itself. It will also apply to Chinese political activities and intentions in view of their influence in the Far East and through China's ties with and aspirations to lead the Third World.

4. Europe. Europe's gradual process of cohesion will be a constant and major intelligence target in view of United States participation in NATO, United States involvement in bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and the importance of Europe to the overall relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Intelligence in Europe will be in great part a matter of following open political and economic activities, supplemented by the need for accurate assessment of their significance and likely future developments. Europe's economy will be a significant intelligence target not only in Europe itself but also with respect to Europe's impact on the Third World and world-wide economic affairs. Eastern Europe will be a constant intelligence target to assess political developments vis-a-vis the USSR and the military and political strength the East European nations individually and collectively bring to the Warsaw Pact.

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5. Economics. Economic intelligence will increase in importance world-wide. This will include economic situations in nations having a major impact on the world economy and on relationships with the United States, such as the Arab oil states, major economic powers such as Japan, major suppliers of food and raw materials, and nations where internal economic chaos can create major world problems out of sympathy or resonance (e.g. India). Intelligence on economic affairs will increasingly become international in scope and include appreciation of the activities of multinational corporations, international development programs and regional and commodity arrangements. In some cases, nations with close political and military bonds to the United States may become important economic intelligence targets, e.g., Canada, Japan, etc. raising complicated problems for intelligence coverage.

6. Intelligence will increasingly be looked to to warn of and explain baffling new situations posing problems to American interests. An example will be to identify the causes of social change, turbulence, and political terrorism in Third World countries, so the component elements of these problems can be isolated, negotiated about or countered with appropriate mechanisms. This may require intelligence to develop new categorizations of behavior and motivation to reflect the differences between societies, cultures and national personalities.

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7. A few of the major problems which will be either the subject of dispute or negotiation, or sometimes both, and consequently will be priority intelligence requirements, can be listed:

(a) Economic interrelationships in monetary, trade, and resource control, especially with respect to long-term inflation; energy demand and supply, and population growth. Patterns of commercial and business activity (the multinational corporations, foreign investment, etc.). The division of return between raw material, processing and finishing operations, and environment control.

(b) Communications and transportation, including movement of goods, information and persons.

(c) Arms limitations, nuclear proliferation and crisis avoidance.

(d) Jurisdiction, exploitation, and relationships in the oceans and on sea beds.

(e) Space exploitation and the use of space with respect to national territories.

Part III - Implications for Intelligence Planning

A. Collection vs. Exploitation

1. Over the past decade, management focus and the allocation of resources have been directed especially to the application of advanced technology to the collection and, to a

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lesser degree, the processing of intelligence data. This has been highly successful, resulting in major substantive advances in our knowledge, particularly with regard to the military capabilities of the Soviet Union. This investment has made a major contribution to the negotiations required for detente.

2. This forward technological progress will soon reach a plateau with new capabilities in the photo and SIGINT fields. This plateau will present large problems of success.

3. Within the time frame of this document, an important and pervasive problem facing the Intelligence Community will be to ensure efficient exploitation of the enormous amounts of data it will be collecting. Exploitation means not only sifting, selecting and processing the most relevant data, but also the application of advanced techniques of transfer of data to the point of ultimate use, to analysis and production and to the presentation of the end products to the ultimate users of intelligence.

4. Action: Study and planning must be initiated by Intelligence Community agencies in:

(a) Processing in rapid time all raw information received, to include selection and discard of non-essential material at the earliest possible time, identification and acceleration of critical material

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and reducing manpower and investment on lower priority material.

(b) Development of improved methods of analysis and production.

(c) Development of improved methods of presentation.

B. Demands vs. Resources

5. Another problem of great magnitude facing the Community over the next five to ten years will be the changing (and in all probability increasing) demands for intelligence while available resources for intelligence decrease in real terms.

6. In the past, the major portion of our intelligence effort has necessarily been deployed against the military capabilities of the Soviet Union and our other adversaries, actual and potential. Even assuming a period of genuine detente, much of this military focus must be maintained because of the importance of this subject to national security and the need for information on the quality of enemy weapons systems. It must not only serve to keep us alert militarily, but also support negotiations and verify arms limitations agreements. At the same time, the demands for other types of intelligence are growing. The result is a probable net increase in demand with a new proportionate mix among political, economic, military and technical target objectives.

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7. This simultaneous shift and increase in requirements is occurring in a period of serious resource constraint and continuing inflation. Until very recently we have had the freedom to invest resources in a number of functional areas simultaneously without undue difficulty. This is no longer true. We will have to accomplish our objectives without the benefit of significantly greater resources. We must find trade-offs in the systems we use, the areas we cover, and the depth of the data we seek.

8. One area which holds promise for greater efficiency is the national/tactical interface. Current studies seek to identify ways by which national programs can more directly support tactical requirements, and vice versa. As more capable and flexible systems come into the national inventory, they must be made to serve the needs of operational forces as well as national-level consumers. Modernized systems and procedures which, by their design, permit greater mutuality of effort between national and force support activities should enable trade-offs achieving net resource savings.

9. Another area can be the optimum interrelationship among overt and clandestine, and technical and human sources. Costly and risky clandestine techniques must only be employed if overt sources cannot be successful in obtaining needed information. The technical can in some cases substitute for

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human effort, but human sources can also at times collect final conclusions rather than masses of technical data.

10. Action: Study and planning must be initiated by Intelligence Community agencies to:

(a) Increase flexibility of responses to changes in priorities for intelligence coverage.

(b) Identify areas in which intelligence coverage can be reduced or carried on a base-line maintenance level, permitting rapid augmentation in case of increased need.

(c) Examine techniques by which national programs can contribute better to departmental needs and vice versa.

(d) Examine areas subject to overt and human source collection reducing the need for clandestine or technical operations.

(e) Develop programs to improve the productivity of intelligence resources in qualitative terms.

C. Technical Systems

11. The great accomplishments of present and projected technical collection systems must not conceal the fact that a major crisis is arising in the future. This stems in part from the necessity of solving the problems of processing and presenting the material collected, noted above. Of even greater concern, however, is the pace of technological change,

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which is upgrading target technology in complexity and in volume at a rapid rate, posing the danger that present systems become obsolescent in reduced time periods. This pace of change affects technology of collection and processing also, however, so that new potentials appear at shorter intervals. A governing restraint on these comes from budget and inflationary pressures. Because of long development and production cycles, the conflicts among these factors must be resolved at early stages, requiring the Intelligence Community to study and plan to:

(a) Identify technological trends in target complexes which will close off access and initiate planning for upgrading current collection and processing systems to assure future coverage.

(b) Research and develop new techniques of collection and processing to capitalize on technological change to give access and coverage to new targets of importance.

(c) Ensure that substantive intelligence needs rather than technological improvement momentum drives investment in upgrading or replacing currently operating and productive systems.

D. Requirements and Evaluation

12. Taking advantage of potential trade-offs will require systematic evaluation of the total effort, and the forging of a much tighter link between the allocation of

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resources and the substantive intelligence result. A start in this direction has been made with the KIQ/KEP, but success will require an increasing commitment from the entire Community. In particular the Community must demonstrate flexibility in reducing at least to a maintenance level intelligence activities providing only marginal results in the circumstances of the time.

13. A critical dimension to better evaluation and more efficient use of resources will be a far better definition of intelligence requirements, both short and long term (the latter in particular with regard to R&D). Today the Community has a confusing variety of means, methods, and vehicles and even language to determine and state requirements. Ways of restructuring the machinery for generating and communicating requirements must be undertaken on both Community and departmental levels. Thus study and planning is required to:

(a) Interrelate the procedures at tactical, departmental and national levels for generating requirements, ensuring optimum satisfaction of each.

(b) Improve communication among intelligence users, producers and collectors to reduce bureaucratic rigidities and improve the responsiveness and flexibility of the intelligence machinery at all levels.

(c) Produce periodic evaluations of the products and performance of the Intelligence Community

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against current primary or maintenance level requirements.

E. Manpower Implications

14. The future responsibilities of the Intelligence Community establish new needs for manpower levels, academic and scientific disciplines and language capabilities. This will be particularly true with respect to human source collection, where depth of cultural knowledge plus greater capabilities in scientific and economic disciplines will be needed. The analyst of the future will have to be comfortable with electronic tools. In our preoccupation recently with manpower reductions, investment in new talent, training and career development, and exposure abroad may have suffered. ~~This cannot~~ be permitted to continue. In particular, steps are needed to deepen our knowledge of foreign cultures and thought processes through language fluency and foreign residence, especially with respect to nations important in political, economic or military terms (e.g., USSR and East Europe, China, Latin America, Arab States, South and Southeast Asia). Collectors and producers must extend their ability to cover both scientific and liberal arts subjects--intelligence must be equally comfortable in either or both of the "two cultures." And the Intelligence Community must undertake affirmative action to ensure equal employment opportunity to keep fully in step with national and government-wide trends.

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15. Advanced information processing and presentation techniques will pose particular manpower training requirements. Indeed, the Intelligence Community should be in the forefront in placing new technologies in the service of users. New methods of analysis, forecasting, coordination and presentation of information must be energetically explored and applied where appropriate. Care must be taken in the application of such new methods and systems to ensure they are designed for the people who will use them and that adequate training in their use is active and integral to the process.

16. The Intelligence Community must study and plan to:

(a) Assure that training and familiarization are undertaken in new methods of collection, analysis and production, particularly in the use of new technical capabilities to increase productivity and precision and save manpower.

(b) Develop selection and training programs in those foreign languages and cultures which will be important intelligence targets of the particular agency in the 1975-1980 time frame.

(c) Ensure the availability of technical and academic talents and expertise in the subjects which will be of importance in the years 1975-1980, e.g., economics,

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(d) Flexibly reduce manpower commitments to lower priority activities and reduce (or reorient to new requirements) the persons freed by such changes in priority.

(e) Develop and apply affirmative action plans for equal employment opportunity.

F. Security

17. The Intelligence Community must develop a satisfactory resolution of its needs for the protection of sources and methods and the American public's right to information about its Government's activities. This may require new legislation, the development of new ways of informing the Congress and the public of the substantive conclusions of the intelligence process and clear standards for compliance with the Freedom of Information Act and Executive Order 11652 (and their exceptions) in the Intelligence Community.

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